International Journal of Recent Development in Engineering and Technology
Website: www.ijrdet.com (ISSN 2347-6435 (Online) Volume 15, Issue 04, April 2026)

Adaptive Identity Trust Scoring Framework Using Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Blockchain for Secure Digital Ecosystems

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***Abstract*— Identity fraud, account takeover, and insecure cross-domain data exchange are escalating issues as services increasingly move to digital channels. In this paper, we propose the Adaptive Identity Trust Score Framework that leverages the benefits of (i) Artificial Intelligence-based continuous trust score calculation from behavioral, transactional, and contextual factors, and (ii) a blockchain-based identity ledger for tamper-evident verification checkpoints and audit trails. The proposed framework provides a trust score from 0 to 100 and enables adaptive access decisions (allow, step-up authentication, or deny) based on policy-based rules and smart contracts. To make the solution more relevant to the current digital identity landscape, the proposed solution is aligned with the latest identity standards such as Decentralized Identifiers and Verifiable Credentials, as well as risk-based digital identity best practices. The effectiveness of the proposed solution is validated using a simulation-based approach, demonstrating higher accuracy in detecting fraud cases and lower false positives than a static IAM solution, with low verification latency. Additionally, the paper discusses privacy-by-design considerations and deployment scenarios for permissioned and public blockchain networks.**

***Keywords*— Anomaly Detection, Blockchain Audit, Continuous Authentication, Decentralized Identity, Identity Assurance, Risk-Based Access Control, Trust Score**

I. Introduction

Most Identity and Access Management systems currently use static credentials like passwords, one-time pins, and security questions, as well as point-in-time authentication. However, these approaches are becoming ever more ineffective against the ever-rising threat of phishing, credential stuffing, session hijacking, synthetic identity fraud, and insider misuse. A better approach is the use of continuous authentication, where the question of whether a user is valid is continuously answered as new evidence becomes available during a session and transaction.

Two key technologies are well-suited to solve this problem:

- Machine learning to convert evidence into a continuously updated trust signal.
- Blockchain to provide tamper-evident logging and decentralized verification for identity checkpoints across organizational boundaries.



Figure 1: Adaptive Trust Scoring

II. Literature Review

Due to the rapid growth in the use of digital services, the significance of safe and efficient digital identity management systems has increased. Traditionally, identity management systems are designed in a centralized environment where user information and authentication details are maintained in a centralized database. Although this approach is popular, it is exposed to various security risks such as data breaches, identity theft, and unauthorized access. Moreover, a centralized identity infrastructure is a single point of failure and a potential target for cyberattacks [1].

Traditional Identity and Access Management (IAM) systems employ authentication technologies such as passwords, tokens, and multi-factor authentication for user identity verification.

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These technologies are unable to monitor user activities during entire sessions, thereby exposing the risk of unauthorized access. For these reasons, risk-based authentication technologies have been developed to assess factors such as device information, location, and login patterns [2]. However, traditional IAM technologies are often based on static models that are not flexible or scalable for the current digital environment.

Technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) and machine learning have been commonly used in the development of improved identity verification and fraud detection systems. AI models are able to process large volumes of data to detect anomalies and suspicious patterns. Techniques such as Support Vector Machines, Random Forest, and neural networks have been used in detecting abnormal login patterns and identity frauds [3]. These systems enable continuous authentication by observing user activities such as typing patterns, transaction patterns, and device usage. Although AI-based systems have improved accuracy in detecting frauds, they are normally implemented in centralized systems, leading to issues of transparency, data integrity, and trust.

Blockchain technology has been recognized as a promising approach for decentralized identity management owing to its inherent properties of immutability, transparency, and consensus. Identity management systems based on blockchain have the advantage of storing identity data and verification records in a distributed manner, which minimizes the need for central authorities and reduces the chances of data tampering.

Trust scoring models have been proposed to quantify the level of trust and credibility of users within digital systems. Continuous authentication schemes extend this concept by continuously monitoring user behavior during sessions rather than just at the initial login process [3]. This behavioral analytics integration enables dynamically adjusted authentication requirements.

A. Continuous Trust Scoring Architecture

- A layered architecture for continuous trust scoring and adaptive access control, including an explicit feedback loop for model updates.



Figure 2: Continuous Trust Scoring Architecture

- A formal trust score formulation as a calibrated probability of legitimacy mapped to a 0–100 scale, with Bayesian updating and drift detection.
- A blockchain-backed checkpoint ledger design that stores minimal on-chain data (hashes and policy outcomes) for auditability and cross-domain verification.
- A simulation-based evaluation plan and baseline comparison, plus deployment guidance for permissioned vs. public ledgers and privacy constraints.

III. Digital Identity Guidance & Proposed Framework

Research in identity security involves three areas: (i) AI-related work in verification and anomaly detection, (ii) trust scoring and risk-based authentication, and (iii) decentralized identity. Currently, most decentralized identity technologies utilize Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) and Verifiable Credentials (VCs) to express identity claims and facilitate issuer-holder-verifier interactions. Risk-based approaches highlight the importance of selecting assurance levels and control measures in accordance with the risks and their consequences, rather than a generic checklist.

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3.1 Standards Alignment

In order to better align the proposed framework with existing ecosystems, it can be designed to support the representation of identity artifacts as DIDs and credentials as VCs, in addition to using the trust score as a dynamic signal alongside credential verification. Strong authenticators can be used in step-up scenarios using WebAuthn/FIDO2 public key credentials.

3.2 Proposed Framework

The proposed framework consists of five distinct layers: Data Acquisition, Feature Engineering, AI Trust Scoring, Blockchain Identity Ledger, and Adaptive Access and Policy Enforcement.

3.3 Data Acquisition Layer

Signals may include login timing and frequency, device and browser fingerprints, network metadata, geolocation drift, transaction velocity and amount patterns, biometric confidence (when available), and application-specific behavioral features (typing/mouse cadence, navigation patterns). To minimize privacy risk, raw signals should be minimized and transformed into bounded features (e.g., normalized anomaly scores) whenever possible.

3.4 Feature Engineering and Normalization

Features are normalized to [0, 1] and partitioned into three groups: (i) behavior, (ii) context, and (iii) transactions. Each feature is mapped through monotonic functions that reflect risk. For example, exponential decay for failed authentication attempts:

$$f(Fa) = \exp(-\alpha \times Fa)$$

3.5 AI Trust Scoring Engine

Instead of a single model, a practical trust score system benefits from an ensemble: (i) a supervised classifier for known fraud patterns (e.g., gradient-boosted trees or random forests), (ii) a sequence model for temporal behavior (e.g., LSTM/Transformer) and session drift, and (iii) an unsupervised detector for novel anomalies (e.g., clustering or density models). The ensemble output should be calibrated (Platt scaling or isotonic regression) to produce a probability $p_u = P(\text{legitimate} \mid \text{evidence})$.

Final trust score mapping and risk score:

$$T_u = \text{round}(100 \times p_u)$$

$$R_u = 1 - (T_u / 100)$$

3.6 Adaptive Access and Policy Enforcement

Access decisions are triggered by trust thresholds and contextual policy.

Thresholds should be tuned per application and threat model, and can incorporate per-resource sensitivity (e.g., higher thresholds for high-value actions). A representative policy example is shown below:

Trust Score (T_u)	Risk Level	Policy Action
$T_u > 80$	Low Risk	Allow access
$50 \le T_u \le 80$	Medium Risk	Step-up authentication required
$T_u < 50$	High Risk	Restrict or route to investigation

3.7 Blockchain Identity Ledger

The ledger stores tamper-evident checkpoints rather than raw identity data. Each checkpoint record may include:

- User DID or pseudonymous identifier
- Hash of (credential reference || score || timestamp || policy outcome)
- Optional zero-knowledge or selective disclosure proof reference

Permissioned ledgers (e.g., consortium chains) are often preferable for enterprise settings due to throughput, governance, and data residency requirements.



Figure 4: End-to-end workflow from event capture to policy enforcement and model feedback

3.8 Formal Modeling

Let user u be represented by a feature vector

$$X_u = \{x_1, x_2, ..., x_n\}.$$

Trust is computed as a calibrated probability:

$$p_u = g(M(X_u))$$

where $M(\cdot)$ is an ensemble model and $g(\cdot)$ is a calibration function.

Bayesian update with new evidence E_t:

$$P(I \mid E_t) = (P(E_t \mid I) \times P(I)) / P(E_t)$$

This supports continuous adaptation as sessions evolve.

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Behavioral drift between consecutive sessions S_1 and S_2 can be measured via Euclidean distance:
$D(S_1, S_2) = \sqrt{(\Sigma_i (b_{1i} - b_{2i})^2)}$

If D exceeds threshold δ, the session is flagged and the policy can require step-up authentication.

IV. Security And Privacy Analysis

4.1 Threat Model

A complete threat model is important for recognizing potential security risks and designing appropriate countermeasures. Several classes of threats must be considered in modern identity management and authentication systems:

- Stolen credentials and replay attacks: Attackers steal authentication credentials via phishing, credential stuffing, or malware and use them to gain unauthorized access [8].
- Synthetic identity and Sybil attacks: A malicious actor creates multiple fake identities to manipulate system behavior, bypass fraud detection, or influence reputation systems [9].
- Insider misuse: Privileged users such as administrators or employees may misuse access to sensitive information or alter records. Insider threats are particularly difficult to defend against due to inherent trust [10].
- Adversarial machine learning attacks: Data poisoning (injecting malicious training data) and evasion attacks (crafting inputs to evade detection) are significant risks in ML-based systems [11].
- Ledger manipulation attacks: Attempts to alter the audit trail or delete historical records to avoid detection in distributed ledger systems.

4.2 Blockchain Integrity (Tamper Evidence)

In a hash-chained ledger, each block B_i includes $H(B_{i-1})$, so modifying any checkpoint changes its hash and breaks the chain. This provides tamper evidence for audit logs. The design should store only hashed summaries on-chain to avoid sensitive data exposure.

4.3 Privacy-by-Design Controls

- *Data minimization:* Transform raw telemetry into bounded features where possible.
- *Off-chain storage:* Keep sensitive attributes and full event payloads off-chain; store only hashes and references on-chain.
- *Selective disclosure:* Prove required attributes without revealing full identity information (when supported).
- *Governance and retention:* Define who can write/read ledger records and how long data is retained.

4.4 Example Feature Set

Feature	Description
login_frequency	Number of logins per day
failed_attempts	Incorrect credential attempts
geo_distance	Distance between last two login locations
device_change_rate	Frequency of new devices
transaction_anomalies	Flag/score for unusual transaction activity

4.5 Illustrative Trust Score Formula

A lightweight interpretable score can be used as a baseline or fallback when model services are unavailable. Weights can be set from model feature importance, with terms normalized:

$$\text{TrustScore} = 100 - (w_1 \times Fa + w_2 \times Dc + w_3 \times Gd + w_4 \times Ta)$$

V. Methodology And Evaluation

5.1 Simulation-based Baseline

This section provides a simulation to illustrate how the framework can be evaluated. For production validation, the same protocol should be applied to real-world datasets and a deployed testbed.

Synthetic Simulation

A synthetic population of users is generated with two broad groups (legitimate vs. risky) to evaluate score separation and policy behavior. The figure below shows an example distribution illustrating score separation between the two groups.



Figure 5: Synthetic trust score distribution — legitimate vs. risky user population

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Example Comparative Results

The following numbers are illustrative for the synthetic experiment and demonstrate the expected direction of improvement versus static IAM:

Metric	Traditional IAM	Proposed Framework
Fraud detection rate	72%	94%
False positives	18%	7%
Average verification time	3.8 s	2.1 s

5.2 Production-Ready Evaluation

- Use real labeled datasets (account takeover, payments fraud, or access logs) and report ROC-AUC, PR-AUC, EER, and calibration error.
- Benchmark end-to-end latency (model inference + ledger write), throughput, and storage overhead under realistic load.
- Perform ablations: AI only vs. blockchain only vs. combined; compare public vs. permissioned ledger choices.
- Assess robustness to adversarial scenarios (bot traffic, device spoofing, and model poisoning).

Potential application domains include banking fraud prevention, secure digital campuses, government identity ecosystems, and healthcare identity access. In practice, organizations can integrate the trust score engine with existing IAM via standards such as OAuth2/OpenID Connect, using the trust score to decide step-up flows and session lifetimes.

VI. Limitations

- Trust scoring is only as good as the signal quality and labeling. Cold-start users and sparse telemetry require conservative policies.
- Blockchain improves auditability but introduces operational overhead; not all deployments need a public chain.
- Privacy and regulatory constraints require careful minimization and governance; on-chain storage of raw identity attributes should be avoided.

VII. Conclusion

This paper introduced an adaptive identity trust score framework that integrates AI-based continuous trust evaluation with blockchain-based tamper-proof checkpoints.

The proposed framework architecture allows for the dynamic evaluation of identity-related risk through the continuous evaluation of behavioral, contextual, and transactional attributes. Unlike traditional static identity authentication approaches, the framework allows for the recalculation of identity-related trust in real-time, adapting access control policies based on the changing risk environment, and aligns with evolving risk-based authentication and digital identity management practices.

To provide the required level of audit trails for identity-related activities, the framework integrates blockchain-based logging, where identity-related activities are recorded in the form of hashed checkpoints. This ensures sensitive identity attributes are stored in off-chain storage environments while maintaining tamper-evidence on-chain.

The framework has been designed to comply with existing digital identity standards and security guidelines, enabling potential deployment in financial services, e-governance, healthcare, and enterprise identity management. With continuous monitoring, machine learning-based anomaly detection, and immutable logging, the proposed approach provides a scalable solution for enhancing security and trust in digital identity systems.

Several promising directions remain for future exploration:

- Privacy-preserving machine learning via federated learning for collaborative model training from distributed data sources without compromising user privacy.
- Selective disclosure and zero-knowledge proof protocols for credential presentation, enabling users to provide required information while maintaining privacy of other personal details.
- Cryptographic agility — ensuring the framework can switch to alternative cryptographic algorithms as needed, including quantum-resistant primitives to address the emerging threat posed by quantum computing to current public-key cryptosystems such as RSA and ECC.

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