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Interwoven Free Will: Conditions, Compulsion, and Moral Responsibility.

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***Abstract*-- Debates on free will have often shifted between libertarian views that suggest completely unconditioned agency and determinist or incompatibilist perspectives that may undermine moral responsibility. This paper argues that both sides fail to fully capture how ordinary human actions work. In response, it proposes a framework called Interwoven Free Will. This framework sees freedom as arising from the interaction between personal conditions, compulsive patterns, and moments of conscious choice. Rather than seeing freedom as the absence of causal influence, this view places agency within a person's ability to reflect on, navigate, and take responsibility for the factors shaping their actions. By analyzing daily decision-making and extreme cases of moral wrongdoing, the paper shows that denying pure libertarian free will does not mean moral responsibility disappears. Instead, responsibility is based on evaluative participation in actions, allowing for different levels of responsibility without losing accountability. Interwoven Free Will thus provide a context-sensitive and realistic view of human freedom that maintains moral responsibility while moving away from metaphysical ideals.**

***Keywords*-- Free-will, Human Agency, Accountability, Decision-making, Analysis**

I. Introduction

If our choices are always shaped by biological, social, and psychological constraints, in what sense are we free and still responsible?

The problem of free will has long occupied philosophical inquiry, centering on whether human actions are genuinely free or determined by factors beyond our control. If choices are governed entirely by causes that precede conscious deliberation, free will may appear illusory. David Hume captures this concern by suggesting that a stone in motion, if endowed with consciousness, might believe itself to be flying freely while in fact being governed by causal necessity.

In contrast, Immanuel Kant argues that abandoning free will undermines the very foundation of morality, since moral responsibility presupposes the capacity to act freely. Without free will, accountability for action becomes unintelligible. This tension between causal determination and moral responsibility forms the core debate between determinist and libertarian accounts of free will.

While both positions offer compelling insights, neither fully captures the complexity of human agency. This paper proposes an alternative framework, ***Interwoven Free Will*** which emphasizes the relational interplay between intrinsic conditions and volitional choice in human decision-making.

Human freedom, on this view, is limited and emergent. Most choices are shaped by pre-existing biological, psychological, and social conditions that structure the range of available options. Within this framework, conscious volitional acts may occur only intermittently, yet they are sufficient to ground meaningful agency and moral responsibility. This paper examines how conditions, compulsions, and voluntary action interact to produce what is here termed Interwoven Free Will.

II. Review Of Existing Research

This section critically examines existing philosophical and scientific perspectives on free will, focusing on determinist, libertarian, and compatibilist accounts that have shaped contemporary debates.

The debate on free will has generated an extensive and diverse body of philosophical literature, addressing questions of causation, moral responsibility, and human agency. Contemporary discussions of free will are commonly structured around three major positions: determinism, libertarianism, and compatibilism.

Determinist Account of Free-will

Determinist accounts of free will argue that human actions are fully governed by prior causes, leaving no room for genuine alternative possibilities. According to this view, every decision is the inevitable outcome of preceding physical, psychological, and environmental conditions.

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Philippa Foot examines this position by questioning whether moral responsibility necessarily collapses under determinism. She argues that responsibility is often ascribed not on the basis of metaphysical freedom, but on the agent's role within a causal structure. Even if actions are causally determined, moral evaluation remains meaningful because it concerns how actions arise from the agent's character, motives, and circumstances rather than from absolute freedom. (Foot, 1957) However, determinism continues to pose a challenge by suggesting that agents could not have acted otherwise, thereby threatening the intuitive basis of moral accountability.

While determinist accounts attempt to preserve moral responsibility within a causally determined framework, critics argue that determinism often conflates causal explanation with genuine determination of choice.

A significant challenge to determinism is presented by Robert Kane through the concept of *retrodiction*, or the prediction of past events based on their effects. Kane (2002) argues that the ability to predict an action after it has occurred does not threaten free will in the same way that determinism does. For instance, if one can predict with certainty that a person chose to drink the previous night based on the presence of a hangover, this does not imply that the original decision was causally determined. Rather, the action is inferred from its consequences. Kane uses this distinction to show that predictability does not necessarily entail determination, thereby weakening the determinist claim that causal predictability undermines freedom of choice.

While determinist accounts successfully explain how human actions are embedded within causal chains, they often struggle to account for the phenomenological experience of agency and the apparent gradations of freedom observed in human decision-making. By treating all actions as equally determined, such accounts risk overlooking moments where reflective deliberation appears to meaningfully influence outcomes, even within constrained conditions. This limitation suggests that while causation shapes the structure of choice, it may not exhaust the explanation of human agency. The challenge, therefore, lies in articulating a framework that acknowledges causal embeddedness without reducing agency to a mere illusion.

Peter van Inwagen's Consequence Argument contends that if determinism were true, then every action would be the inevitable result of prior events and the laws of nature, over which agents have no control.

Since we have no control over the past or the laws governing it, determinism implies that agents cannot genuinely act otherwise. Consequently, determinism undermines the possibility of free will and challenges the very foundation of moral responsibility. While this argument does not by itself establish libertarian free will, it highlights a fundamental limitation of determinist accounts and motivates the search for alternative frameworks that reconcile human freedom with causal influences.

Libertarian Account of Free-Will

Libertarian advocates of free will argue that human agents possess a form of freedom that is incompatible with causal determinism. According to this view, genuinely free actions must not be fully determined by prior events or conditions. However, the plausibility of such freedom raises a persistent philosophical difficulty: whether any human agent has ever exercised free will in a manner entirely unconditioned by internal or external causes. Given that choices appear to arise from prior psychological states, environmental influences, and biological factors, libertarian freedom faces the challenge of explaining how actions can be free without being causally arbitrary.

Libertarianism thus maintains that free will is incompatible with determinism and that genuine freedom requires some form of nondeterministic causation in human decision-making (Ekstrom, 2018). Yet critics argue that introducing indeterminism into the causal chain risks rendering actions random or capricious, thereby undermining the agent's control and capacity for reasoned choice (Clarke, 2003). If decisions are not causally necessitated, it is unclear how agents can be responsible for them rather than merely subject to chance.

Event-causal libertarianism attempts to resolve this tension by locating free agency within nondeterministic mental events, such as beliefs and desires, which causally produce actions without deterministic necessity (Franklin, 2018). On this account, decisions emerge from an agent's reasons and mental states, even though those states do not fully determine the outcome. Proponents argue that this allows for meaningful control and moral responsibility without collapsing freedom into randomness.

Nevertheless, the notion of a form of free will entirely free from conditioning remains problematic. Human agents are deeply embedded in causal networks shaped by genetics, upbringing, social environment, and unconscious processes.

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These influences raise doubts about whether any decision can be wholly independent of causal antecedents. Although libertarian theorists distinguish between randomness and agency, arguing that nondeterministic processes can still instantiate control (Finch and Warfield, 1998), the extent to which such accounts successfully reconcile freedom with pervasive causal influence remains contested.

Compatibilism

Compatibilist views on free will seek to bridge the gap between human freedom and causal determinism by rejecting the idea that free action requires the ability to choose otherwise. Instead, compatibilists describe freedom as acting according to one's desires, intentions, or reasons, as long as these actions are not forced or limited by outside influences. Therefore, actions can be causally determined yet still considered free if they arise from an individual's internal mental states (Levy and Mckenna, 2009; Ekstrom, 2018).

A notable development in compatibilism is the introduction of Frankfurt-style cases, which challenge the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). According to PAP, moral responsibility depends on the ability to have acted differently. Frankfurt cases indicate that a person can be morally responsible even when they do not have alternative actions available, as long as they act voluntarily and in line with their own motivations. This change allows compatibilists to maintain moral responsibility without needing alternative options, thus remaining compatible with determinism (Levy and Mckenna, 2009; Ekstrom, 2018; The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2005).

However, critics suggest that this viewpoint alters the traditional idea of free will by equating it simply with the lack of external pressure instead of real alternative options. This change risks simplifying free will to just a psychological agreement with one's motivations, potentially ignoring the intuitive worry that under determinism, agents lack real choices. This criticism points out that while compatibilism can explain responsibility in deterministic contexts, it might not fully capture what free will means in our daily lives (Kane, 2000).

Additional concerns stem from compatibilism's focus on internal mental states—desires, intentions, and reasons—which are themselves shaped by earlier causes, including biological, social, and environmental influences. Since these mental states are influenced by factors beyond the agent's control, compatibilist freedom maintains agency at the action level but does not fully examine the deeper development of that agency.

This observation implies that while compatibilism offers a logical account of moral responsibility consistent with determinism, it may distance free will from the genuine experience of choice and self-authorship (Kane, 2000).

Philosophers like Daniel Dennett support compatibilism by arguing that the types of free will worth pursuing—those connected to moral and artistic responsibility—are compatible with scientific determinism. Dennett's work highlights that issues related to free will often stem from misunderstandings, and that determinism does not eliminate reason, control, or responsibility. His compatibilist viewpoint aims to preserve what truly matters in the everyday understanding of free will by focusing on how actions come from the agent's control instead of on metaphysical alternative possibilities (Dennett, 2015).

Moreover, interventionist perspectives enhance compatibilism by distinguishing between manipulated agents and determined agents. While manipulated agents do not have true control because their intentions come from outside influences, determined agents can remain the source of their actions internally. This difference reinforces the compatibilist claim that moral responsibility can coexist with determinism by showing how actions can start within the agent despite lawful causal limits (Deery and Nahmias, 2016).

In summary, compatibilist views align free will with determinism by redefining freedom in terms of internal mental states and removing the need for alternative possibilities for moral responsibility. Frankfurt-style cases are crucial in this shift as they challenge PAP. Yet this approach faces criticism for possibly reducing free will to simple psychological agreement and overlooking the origins of mental states that shape agency. Still, compatibilism stands as a significant and sophisticated viewpoint in modern philosophical discussions about free will and moral responsibility, providing a clear framework that maintains agency and accountability within a deterministic perspective (Levy and Mckenna, 2009; Ekstrom, 2018; Kane, 2000; Dennett, 2015; Deery and Nahmias, 2016).

Beyond the dominant libertarian and compatibilist positions, several additional theories contribute significantly to the free will debate, though each encounters notable limitations. Incompatibilism, in its traditional form, maintains that free will and determinism cannot both be true. If determinism holds, then agents lack the alternative possibilities required for genuine freedom and moral responsibility (Ekstrom, 2018). This position underscores the intuitive link between freedom and the ability to do otherwise, but it leaves open the question of what form free will could take if determinism is rejected.

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A distinctive variant, often described as *incompatibilism without libertarianism*, endorses the incompatibility claim while refraining from committing to libertarian indeterminism as a positive metaphysical alternative. Rather than offering a substantive account of free agency, this view confines itself to the negative thesis that determinism undermines free will. While this approach successfully highlights tensions within deterministic frameworks, its reluctance to articulate a viable model of freedom limits its explanatory scope (Ekstrom, 2018).

In contrast, agent-causal libertarianism proposes a more robust metaphysical account by grounding free will in agent causation rather than event causation. On this view, agents themselves are the fundamental sources of action, capable of initiating causal chains independently of antecedent deterministic or probabilistic conditions. This form of self-originating causation is intended to secure the kind of metaphysical freedom required for moral responsibility (Clarke, 2003; Pereboom, 2014).

Agent-causal libertarianism is often presented as an improvement over event-causal libertarianism, which attributes free actions to nondeterministic mental events but struggles to account for the agent's role as an active, self-determining source. By attributing a distinctive causal power to agents, agent-causal theories aim to preserve rational control while avoiding the charge that indeterminism collapses into randomness (Clarke, 2003).

Nevertheless, agent-causal accounts face persistent challenges, most notably the *luck objection*, which questions whether indeterminism can genuinely enhance control rather than introduce arbitrariness. Additionally, the metaphysical intelligibility of agent causation itself remains contested, with critics arguing that it risks invoking an obscure or unexplained form of causation (Clarke, 2003; Pereboom, 2014). Meanwhile, incompatibilism without libertarianism continues to expose unresolved conceptual tensions, reinforcing the difficulty of articulating a coherent account of free will that avoids both determinism and metaphysical excess (Ekstrom, 2018).

Taken together, these positions illustrate the persistent fragmentation within incompatibilist approaches. While agent-causal libertarianism offers a substantive attempt to ground freedom and responsibility beyond deterministic constraints, and incompatibilism without libertarianism underscores the depth of the problem, neither provides an entirely satisfactory resolution of the tension between causal embeddedness and genuine agency.

We have now seen how every major theory of free will falls short in one place or another. Each captures something important about human action, yet none offers a fully satisfactory account of how freedom can exist within the causal structures that shape our lives. This persistent gap calls for a framework that neither denies causal influence nor imagines freedom as wholly detached from it.

III. Interwoven Free Will: A Layered Model Of Human Agency



To better understand how human freedom emerges, it is helpful to visualize the layered structure through which our actions are formed. Much of what we do is governed by conditions beyond our direct control, while habitual and compulsive patterns guide many of our everyday responses. Within these constraints, a more limited but significant space remains for conscious, volitional choice.

By representing these layers as nested circles, this model illustrates how freedom exists within a structured context and how *Interwoven Free Will* emerges from the interaction between conditions, compulsions, and voluntary action.

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The diagram depicts momentum created by intrinsic conditions and compulsions, within which conscious agency operates. Rather than treating freedom as something that exists outside causation, the model shows how agency functions *within* an already moving framework.

The largest circle represents intrinsic ground of conditions, the factors that exist prior to conscious thought and shape the range of possible actions. These conditions include biological influences such as neural activity and hormonal states, psychological factors like personality traits and emotions, and social or cultural pressures that frame our decisions. Intrinsic conditions cannot be controlled, yet they form the foundation upon which all human action occurs. They define the environment in which volitional acts can take place, setting the boundaries for choice without determining the specific actions themselves.

Within the realm of intrinsic conditions lies compulsion, which represents habitual or instinctive behaviors that partially guide our actions. Compulsions emerge from repeated patterns, instincts, or deeply ingrained responses and often operate automatically, without conscious deliberation. While they are influenced by intrinsic conditions, compulsions act as filters, shaping the way we respond to the environment and constraining the choices available for volitional acts. Although they limit freedom, they do not completely eliminate the possibility of conscious intervention.

The smallest circle represents conscious, volitional acts, which are the moments when an individual exercises genuine choice within the constraints of intrinsic conditions and compulsion. These acts occur only occasionally, yet they are significant because they introduce real agency and responsibility into human behavior. While most actions are influenced or guided by conditions and compulsions, volitional acts allow individuals to reflect, decide, and intervene in the course of their own behavior. It is in this sphere that Interwoven Free Will emerges, as freedom manifests in the interaction between constraints and conscious choice.

This layered framework can be clarified through the following structure:

Premise A: Human actions occur within intrinsic conditions that exist prior to conscious deliberation and are not subject to direct control.

Premise B: Compulsions arise from repeated patterns, instincts, and habits, further shaping available responses.

Conclusion C: Volitional acts emerge from the interaction of intrinsic conditions and compulsions, representing moments of conscious agency.

Freedom, on this account, is not absolute. It emerges whenever conscious choice navigates the structured space created by conditions and compulsive tendencies.

Having established this layered structure, the discussion now turns to a closer examination of intrinsic conditions and compulsion. A detailed analysis of these components is necessary to understand how deeply they shape the space in which volitional acts emerge, and why freedom, on this account, must be understood as interwoven rather than absolute.

The intrinsic ground refers to those conditions that precede conscious choice and are not subject to direct control. It shows the conditions that binds a human being essentially from doing an action based on their free-will. These conditions form the ground upon which all decisions are made, yet they themselves do not arise from deliberation or choice. They exist prior to conscious reflection and shape the range of possibilities within which agency operates.

Intrinsic conditions include biological factors such as neural structure, genetic predispositions, and hormonal states; psychological elements such as temperament, emotional dispositions, and early formative experiences; and social or cultural influences that establish norms, values, and expectations. Together, these factors constitute the background against which all human action unfolds.

Importantly, to describe these conditions as intrinsic is not to claim that they rigidly determine behaviour. Rather, they define the *field of action,* the environment of possibilities and limitations within which volitional acts can occur. While individuals cannot step outside this field at will, they may reflect upon and respond to it in varying ways.

Consider an individual raised in an environment where emotional restraint is consistently valued and expressed. From an early age, displays of vulnerability are discouraged, while composure and self-control are praised. This background does not operate as an explicit rule imposed on each decision; rather, it forms an intrinsic condition that shapes how situations are perceived and interpreted.

As an adult, this individual encounters moments of emotional distress yet experiences discomfort at the thought of expressing it openly. The hesitation does not arise from a conscious decision to suppress emotion, nor from external coercion in the immediate situation. Instead, the individual experiences emotional restraint as the natural and appropriate response. The intrinsic condition has already framed what counts as a viable or acceptable reaction.

In this case, the individual's behavior is not determined by a specific deliberative choice, yet it is not random or externally forced. The intrinsic condition structures the space of possible responses before conscious reflection occurs, illustrating how human action is shaped at a foundational level without eliminating the potential for later agency.

This illustrates how intrinsic conditions operate not as commands, but as background frameworks that quietly guide perception and response.

Repeated engagement with such frameworks gives rise to habitual patterns of behavior, which constitute the domain of *compulsion*.

Compulsion occupies the layer between intrinsic conditions and conscious, volitional acts. While intrinsic conditions form the background of human action, compulsions arise through repetition, reinforcement, and familiarity. They are not present at birth in the way intrinsic conditions are, nor are they fully conscious choices. Instead, compulsions develop over time as stable patterns of response to recurring situations.

Compulsions emerge when certain responses repeatedly succeed in managing internal states or external demands. Over time, these responses become automatic, requiring little to no conscious deliberation. What initially may have involved reflection gradually solidifies into habit. In this way, compulsions function as *default pathways* through which intrinsic conditions express themselves in action.

Importantly, compulsions are not inherently irrational or pathological. Many are adaptive and necessary for everyday functioning. Social routines, emotional coping strategies, and behavioural habits allow individuals to navigate the world efficiently without constant deliberation. However, precisely because compulsions operate automatically, they significantly constrain the range of responses that are experienced as available or natural in a given situation.

Unlike intrinsic conditions, compulsions are partially malleable, though not easily so. They are shaped by past experiences and reinforced by outcomes, yet once established, they resist immediate change. An individual does not choose a compulsion at the moment it operates; rather, the compulsion *presents itself* as the obvious or immediate response.

This gives compulsions a distinctive role in limiting freedom. They do not eliminate agency outright, but they narrow the space within which volitional acts can occur. In many cases, action flows through compulsive pathways without reflective engagement, giving rise to the experience of acting freely while remaining largely guided by habit.

If an individual who, over time, has learned to avoid confrontation because earlier attempts to assert themselves were met with conflict or rejection. Initially, avoidance may have been a conscious strategy to maintain emotional safety. Through repetition, however, this strategy becomes habitual. Eventually, the individual withdraws from disagreement almost automatically, without actively deciding to do so.

In moments of potential conflict, the individual experiences avoidance not as a chosen response but as the most immediate and comfortable one. The compulsion does not arise from explicit reasoning, nor is it imposed externally in the moment. Instead, it reflects a patterned response shaped by prior interactions and reinforced over time.

Here, behaviour is neither strictly determined by intrinsic conditions nor freely chosen in a reflective sense. The compulsion channels action along a familiar route, demonstrating how habitual patterns can govern behaviours while still leaving open the possibility of later conscious intervention.

Compulsions, therefore, represent a critical site of tension within human agency. They enable efficient action while simultaneously constraining reflective choice. Most everyday actions occur at this level, where behavior is guided by established patterns rather than deliberate decision-making. As a result, much of what is experienced as freedom is, in fact, freedom *within* compulsion.

At this stage, a concern naturally arises regarding moral responsibility. If human actions are so deeply shaped by intrinsic conditions and compulsive patterns, it may appear that genuine responsibility is undermined. However, this conclusion follows only if responsibility is assumed to require action entirely free from influence. On the present account, this assumption is rejected. Even when actions are shaped by conditions and compulsions, individuals do not act *because* of these influences in a mechanically causal sense; rather, they act *on the basis of* them. Intrinsic conditions and compulsions inform the reasons, motivations, and perceptions through which agents engage with the world, but they do not bypass the agent's evaluative capacities. As long as an individual recognizes, endorses, or meaningfully responds to these reasons, their action remains attributable to them.

Moral responsibility, on this account, is grounded not in the absence of influence, but in the agent's capacity to navigate, reflect upon, and take ownership of the influences that shape action.

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Compulsions do not exhaust the structure of human action. In certain moments often marked by disruption, reflection, or conflict individuals become aware of these patterned responses and may choose to act otherwise. It is within such moments that conscious, volitional agency becomes possible.

Volition, as understood in this framework, refers to the agent's capacity to evaluate, endorse, resist, or redirect impulses arising from conditions and compulsions. It is neither the absence of influence nor the mere expression of impulse, but a mediated act of self-governance. While compulsions exert directional pressure on action, volitional acts involve the agent's recognition of that pressure and their reflective stance toward it. A compulsion urges; volition responds.

Consider an individual with a long-standing disposition toward anger shaped by upbringing and past experiences. When provoked, an immediate impulse to react aggressively arises. This impulse is not chosen; it is conditioned. However, the subsequent action—whether to act on the impulse, suppress it, redirect it, or delay response—depends on the agent's evaluative engagement with that impulse. The presence of anger does not determine the action; it presents a field within which volition operates.

Moral responsibility, on this view, attaches not to the origin of impulses but to the manner in which agents relate to them. An individual is responsible insofar as they act through volitional engagement rather than being wholly overridden by compulsion.

The implications of Interwoven Free Will become especially clear in extreme cases, such as serious moral wrongdoing. If moral responsibility can be preserved even where actions are deeply shaped by conditions and compulsions, then responsibility does not depend on the existence of pure, unconditioned free will. The following case considers an act of murder, often assumed to require the strongest form of libertarian freedom.

Consider an individual who has grown up in a persistently violent environment, marked by emotional neglect, exposure to aggression, and instability. Over time, these experiences form intrinsic conditions shaping the individual's emotional regulation, threat perception, and impulse control. As an adult, the individual develops compulsive patterns of anger and defensive aggression, responding automatically to perceived provocation.

During a heated confrontation, the individual experiences intense emotional arousal and kills another person. The act appears sudden, yet it is intelligible only in light of the individual's psychological history, habitual responses, and situational pressures.

From a libertarian perspective, moral responsibility for such an act requires that the agent possessed the capacity to have done otherwise in a robust, metaphysically independent sense. The killing must originate from the agent as a self-determining cause, not sufficiently explained by prior conditions, psychological disposition, or environmental influence.

However, this requirement creates a tension. To the extent that the act is explained by the agent's history, character, and emotional conditioning, libertarian freedom is threatened. Yet to deny the relevance of these factors in order to preserve pure freedom risks rendering the act morally unintelligible. The action becomes detached from the reasons, emotions, and patterns that make it understandable as a human deed rather than a random occurrence.

Interwoven Free Will rejects the assumption that moral responsibility requires such metaphysical purity. The individual's intrinsic conditions and compulsive tendencies are not denied; they are central to explaining why the act occurred. However, explanation does not amount to exculpation.

Even in this constrained context, the agent acts on the basis of reasons shaped by their history rather than being bypassed by it. The individual perceives the situation, evaluates it through a conditioned lens, and responds in a way that expresses their dispositions and values at that moment. The action is not free because it is uncaused, but because it is attributable to the agent as the one who enacted it.

Moral responsibility, on this account, does not depend on the absence of influence but on the presence of agency within influence. The agent is responsible not because they stood outside all conditions, but because the action issued from their evaluative framework, however distorted or constrained it may be.

At the same time, Interwoven Free Will allows for degrees of responsibility. The more an action is dominated by compulsive patterns and overwhelming intrinsic conditions, the more limited the agent's volitional space becomes. This does not eliminate responsibility, but it complicates it, allowing for a nuanced understanding of blame, punishment, and moral assessment.

This case demonstrates that the absence of pure libertarian free will does not collapse moral responsibility. Instead, it reveals responsibility as grounded in the agent's participation in action, even when that participation is shaped, constrained, and imperfect. Interwoven Free Will thus offers a framework capable of explaining both moral accountability and the deep influence of conditions that libertarianism struggles to accommodate.

What this case reveals is not merely a different explanation of wrongdoing, but a shift in how freedom and responsibility are conceptually linked. The demand for pure, unconditioned free will places responsibility at a metaphysical distance from human psychology. By contrast, locating responsibility within evaluative engagement allows agency to remain intelligible even under significant constraint. The action remains morally assessable not because it escapes causal influence, but because it reflects the agent's way of responding to those influences.

This paper began by examining dominant approaches to the problem of free will and moral responsibility, each of which captures an important aspect of human agency while leaving significant gaps. Libertarian accounts insist on metaphysical independence from prior causes, but struggle to explain how such purity of freedom is either intelligible or necessary for responsibility. Determinist and incompatibilist views, while attentive to the depth of causal influence on human action, risk dissolving agency into mere outcome, leaving responsibility philosophically fragile.

In response to these tensions, this paper proposed the framework of **Interwoven Free Will**, a model that situates human freedom within, rather than outside of, the structures that shape action. By distinguishing between intrinsic conditions, compulsive patterns, and moments of volitional intervention, this account rejects the assumption that freedom must be unconditioned to be meaningful. Human action is deeply influenced, but not thereby rendered morally void.

Interwoven Free Will denies the existence of pure libertarian freedom as traditionally conceived. Human agents do not act in isolation from their histories, psychological dispositions, or social contexts. However, the absence of such metaphysical purity does not eliminate responsibility. Instead, responsibility is grounded in the agent's capacity to recognize, navigate, and take ownership of the influences that inform their reasons and actions.

Agents act not because of conditions in a mechanically causal sense, but on the basis of them, through evaluative engagement.

The examination of extreme cases, including serious moral wrongdoing, further demonstrated that explanation does not amount to exculpation. Even where intrinsic conditions and compulsions exert significant force, actions remain attributable to agents insofar as they express the agent's evaluative standpoint. At the same time, this framework allows for degrees of responsibility, reflecting the variable space available for volitional intervention. Such nuance offers a more realistic and ethically sensitive account of blame and accountability than models that rely on all-or-nothing freedom.

Ultimately, Interwoven Free Will reframes freedom as relational, emergent, and context-sensitive. It preserves what is most compelling in compatibilist and libertarian intuitions while avoiding their respective excesses. Freedom is neither an illusion produced by causal blindness nor a metaphysical anomaly detached from human psychology. It is an achievement that arises, imperfectly but meaningfully, within the interwoven structure of conditions, habits, and conscious choice. In recognizing this, the theory offers a defensible account of moral responsibility that remains grounded in the realities of human life.

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